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ABSTRACT 
The principle of complementarity was supported by China 
throughout the whole negotiation process of establishing the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  However, China had 
reservations over the way in which the principle of complementarity 
was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute, which was part of 
the rationale leading to China’s decision not to join the ICC at that 
time.  On one level, China’s concerns regarding complementarity 
relate to the uncertainties about whether issues of fair trial per se 
will be addressed by the ICC in the context of admissibility; at 
another level, they echo China’s traditional position with respect to 
international judicial bodies.  This article examines the substance of 
the articulated Chinese concerns regarding complementarity in light 
of the ICC’s jurisprudence, China’s domestic judicial system, and its 
progressively greater engagement with international adjudication to 
see if these concerns still constitute a significant impediment to 
China’s accession to the ICC.  It also questions how the notion of, 
and the discourse surrounding, Chinese characteristics or Asian 
values on human rights may or may not explain Chinese and Asian 
resistance to ICC participation in the context of complementarity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China has long been supporting the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court.  It has considered that the 
creation of such an institution is a positive addition to the 
international legal system.  To this end, China was actively involved 
in the discussions leading to the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).1  In the course of the negotiations, the Chinese 
delegation identified and raised a range of specific concerns, some 
of which were taken on board at that time, and some of which 
remained outstanding.  In 1998, at the conclusion of the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference, while 120 countries voted in favor of the 
adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, China was among the 
seven states that voted against it. 2   The Chinese delegation 
articulated several reasons for not joining the ICC at that time, which 
were all framed in legal terms. 3  Since its negative vote in Rome, 
China’s interest in the ICC has not diminished.  In fact, China has 
consistently maintained a dialogue with the ICC and involved itself 
in the process leading to the Court’s continuous evolution.4  Despite 
 
 1 Bing Bing Jia, China and the International Criminal Court: Current Situation, 10 
SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 87, 87-88 (2006). 
 2  Press Release, United Nations, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in 
Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. 
Press Release L/2889 (July 20, 1998), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html 
[https://perma.cc/SCB2-TNXB]. 
 3  See Guangya Wang, in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 3d 
plenary mtg., at 75, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3 (June 16, 1998) (reaffirming the 
importance of the principle of complementarity in underpinning the actions and 
decisions of the Court); see also Wensheng Qu, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 53d Sess., 
9th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.9 (Nov. 4, 1998) (stating China’s comments 
on several issues, such as jurisdictions, definitions of crimes, power of prosecutors, 
and principle of complementarity). 
 4 See Guan Jian, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 15th mtg. at 6, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.15 (Nov. 28, 2003) (highlighting China’s active involvement in 
establishing the International Criminal Court and its continued support of its aims, 
despite not being a signatory to the Rome Statute); see also Dahai Qi, in U.N. GAOR, 
6th Comm., 59th Sess., 6th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.6, (Nov. 1, 2004) 
(reaffirming China’s commitment to the goals of the International Criminal Court 
as indicated by previous initiatives to support the work and development of the 
Court); Xinmin Ma, Deputy Dir.-Gen. of the Dep’t of Treaty and Law of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of China, Statement of the Chinese Observer Delegation at the 
General Debate in the 16th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 7, 2017), at 2, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-CHI.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF99-
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being a non-party to the Rome Statute, the Chinese government 
continued to send its delegates to meetings of the Assembly of States 
Parties, where it voiced its views on a number of issues.5   As a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, China also played 
a constructive role in passing the resolutions of the Council 
regarding the effective functioning of the ICC. 6  All these different 
 
RWZ4] (transcript available in the International Criminal Court’s ASP Document 
Index) (expressing China’s longstanding support for collective legal efforts to 
combat international crime, including the International Criminal Court). 
 5 See Xinmin Ma, supra note 4, at 3–9 (suggesting as  that the ICC adheres to 
the Rome Statute and addresses crime of aggression cautiously); Guo Xiaomei, 
Counselor of the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of China (China Observer Delegation) at the 14th Session of the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Nov. 18–26, 2015), 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/GenDeb/ASP14-GenDeb--OS-
China-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL42-8AJ9] (transcript available in the 
International Criminal Court’s ASP Documents Index) (recommending that the 
International Criminal Court adheres to the principle of complementarity and those 
aims established in the UN Charter to effectively implement the objectives of the 
Rome Statute); Xinmin Ma, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Treaty 
and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (Observer Delegation) at the 
13th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, (Dec. 8–17, 2014), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/GenDeba/ICC-ASP13-GenDeba-China-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BMU-PYDG] (transcript available in the 
International Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index) (urging the International 
Criminal Court to achieve a consensus view on the interpretation and application 
of the Rome Statute to enhance the legitimacy of the Court); Statement of China at 
11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties  (Nov. 15, 2012), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICC-ASP11-GenDeba-CHN-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript available in the International 
Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index) (reiterating China’s view that the 
International Criminal Court must adhere to the UN Charter and the principle of 
complementarity, respect non-member states, and pursue both crime prevention 
and peace creation); Xu Hong, Head of Chinese Delegation, at the General Debate 
of the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Nov. 20, 2009), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-China-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3SB-A439] (transcript available in the ASP’s 
Document Index) (advising the International Criminal Court to observe the guiding 
principles of international law and encouraging other countries to engage in the 
improvement and development of the Court). 
 6  China voted in favor of the Security Council resolution referring the 
situation of Libya to the International Criminal Court. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st 
mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011).  See generally S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 
2011) (referring the situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the International 
Criminal Court).  China abstained in the Security Council vote referring the 
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 
5158th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).  See generally S.C. Res. 1593 
(Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court). 
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forms of engagement indicate that China has left open the possibility 
of full participation in the ICC. 
As of September 1, 2019, the ICC has been in operation for more 
than 15 years and has 122 member states.7  There appears to be an 
irreversible momentum towards the establishment and ongoing 
refinement of a system of international criminal justice designed to 
bring to account those responsible for international crimes.  
Historically, China was involved and played a significant role in the 
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.8  China’s reluctance to 
join the ICC, however, has led to doubts regarding China’s 
international reputation as a large and responsible nation upholding 
international justice and human rights.  The ICC, on the other hand, 
requires sustained support and cooperation from states in order to 
be truly representative and effective.  Representing one-fifth of the 
world’s population and being part of the most underrepresented 
region at the ICC, China’s participation would be a step towards the 
Court’s universality.  With no enforcement mechanism of its own, 
the ICC’s effective functioning is largely dependent on the 
cooperation it receives from party states.  Lack of cooperation by 
non-party states, especially major powers such as China, the U.S., 
and Russia, will severely constrain its effectiveness. 
While China is on its way to becoming a global superpower, it 
still refers to itself as the world’s largest developing country and 
places great emphasis on the principle of sovereignty.  The various 
Chinese concerns towards the ICC are likely to demonstrate its dual 
roles: first, as the leader of developing countries trying to prevent 
unjustified encroachments into their domestic affairs and second, as 
a global power to guard against the weakening of its authority 
among the United Nations Security Council and its permanent 
members.  Thus, a close examination of the Chinese perspective will 
feed into broader debates on the trends of state engagement and 
disengagement with the ICC among different world blocs.  Those 
 
 7  The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%2
0the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/RM4Y-ZXSU]. 
 8  See Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (expressing China’s support for the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Jian Chen, in U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 
3175th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (Feb. 22, 1993) (expressing China’s support 
for the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). 
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concerns involve questions about national sovereignty, non-
interference in particular, that are not singular to China, but are 
shared by most of the other Asian states which have not ratified the 
Statute. 9  The overall relationship between Asia and the ICC can be 
described as one of particular hesitation. 10   China, as the most 
populous and powerful country in the region, is an influential actor.  
As such, addressing conceivable legal obstacles for China’s 
accession to the ICC could potentially inspire other Asian states to 
engage more directly with the Court. 
China’s relationship with the ICC is also part of its broader 
dialogue with international adjudication and international law.  
Given its rapidly rising power, China has revised its traditional 
pattern of distancing itself from international mechanisms of a 
judicial character, 11  and there have been substantial Chinese 
movements in relation to international adjudication in certain areas 
since the 1990s.12  However, the level of confidence held by China in 
engaging with international adjudicative bodies has not yet 
transmitted to those governing human rights issues.  A study on 
Chinese concerns about the ICC will help better explain why this 
hesitancy has persisted despite China’s fast-growing competence in 
international adjudication and global legal affairs.  These broader 
implications suggest the need for a profound and deep 
understanding of China’s position on the ICC. 
The Chinese position towards the ICC is based on a range of 
specific concerns, which can be grouped into two kinds.  One is on 
 
 9 See Xing Yun, Asia’s Reticence Towards Universal Jurisdiction, 4(1) GRONINGEN 
J. INT’L L. 54, 58 (2016) (explaining Asian states’ imperative to protect national 
sovereignty and their commitment to the principle of non-intervention, rooted in 
their historical experience of imperialism, which can limit their participation in and 
hinder the efforts of international organizations). 
 10 See Simon Chesterman, International Criminal Law with Asian Characteristics? 
14-16 (Nat’l Univ. of Sing. L. Working Paper No. 2014/002, 2014) (noting the low 
proportion of Asian states that accept the International Criminal Court’s 
jurisdiction and similarly, the lack of Asian state engagement in the Court’s 
discussions). 
 11 See Phil C. W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law since the Opium 
War, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 886 (2014) (explaining that China’s reticence to 
participate in international judicial organizations is underpinned by a belief that 
interstate conflicts should be resolved through negotiation rather than legal 
proceedings). 
 12  See Dan Zhu, China, the International Criminal Court, and International 
Adjudication, 61 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 43, 55 (2014) (noting China’s increased 
involvement in international adjudication in the economic and technical areas, 
although its involvement has been least pronounced in the domain of human 
rights). 
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the jurisdictional issue of the ICC, and the other concerns the 
definition of the core crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.  While 
the Chinese concerns about the core crimes are ICC-specific, the 
jurisdictional concerns have historical resonance with China’s 
traditional approach towards international judicial bodies, which 
includes a strong emphasis on a strict concept of sovereignty.  The 
principle of complementary jurisdiction was supported by China 
throughout the whole negotiation process, but China had 
reservations over the way in which the principle of complementarity 
was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute.  Given the 
centrality of state sovereignty to the Chinese thinking in 
international legal matters, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction 
and its practical application hold great importance to China’s 
consideration of its relationship with the ICC. 
While concern with complementary jurisdiction was articulated 
by the Chinese authorities as one of the legal barriers preventing its 
move towards full participation in the ICC in 1998, the Court has 
been in operation for over a decade, and there have been substantive 
developments both in law and in practice surrounding the ICC 
Statute.  Undoubtedly, back in 1998, there was still a lack of clarity 
as to precisely how aspects of the complementarity principle would 
apply in practice; matters like this would only become clear after the 
Court had the opportunity to consider, in detail, the relevant terms 
of the Rome Statute governing complementary jurisdiction during 
the course of proceedings brought before it.  The question remains 
as to whether the Chinese concerns have become less robust or have 
been cured in the light of relevant developments. 
The Chinese perspective on the ICC’s complementarity regime, 
however, has been subject to relatively little sustained academic 
attention to date.  Although there is a growing body of literature 
discussing the overall China-ICC relationship from either a legal,13 
 
 13 See Jianping Lu & Zhixiang Wang, China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 608, 619 (2005) (setting forth reasons in favor of Chinese participation in 
the ICC, including mutual interests, the ICC’s capacity to adjudicate issues 
concerning non-state parties, and the rights associated with State Party status); see, 
e.g., Dan Zhu, From Tokyo to Rome: A Chinese Perspective, in HISTORICAL WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS IN ASIA 31 (Daqun Liu & Binxin Zhang eds., 2016) (tracing China’s reluctance 
to engage in international criminal tribunals, in part, to the perceived deficiencies 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East after World War II, but also 
reiterating China’s longstanding support of the establishment and development of 
the International Criminal Court). 
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policy, 14  or comparative perspective, 15  as well as the Chinese 
attitude towards the core crimes under the Rome Statute,16 almost 
no systemic studies have been made on China’s specific concerns 
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional regime.  This article, therefore, 
aims to fill the academic vacuum by critically examining the Chinese 
position in the context of the design and emerging practice of the 
ICC’s complementarity regime.  Against the above background, the 
article is structured as follows.  It first provides a description of 
China’s engagement with negotiations on the complementary 
jurisdiction of the ICC and the arguments made by the Chinese 
authorities during this process.  It then examines the Chinese 
concerns relating to complementarity, both in the abstract and in 
light of the subsequent developments, to see if they are legally 
sound and still as significant as they first appeared.  As China’s 
position on the ICC’s complementarity system is partly informed by 
its domestic situation, this article continues to assess the extent to 
which China’s national criminal judicial system meets international 
standards.  In addition, as China and other Asian states traditionally 
hold an almost absolutist understanding of national sovereignty and 
 
 14  See  Congrui Qiao, On Discrepancy and Synergy Between China and the 
International Criminal Court, FICHL Policy Brief Series, no. 72, 2016, at 4 (recognizing 
the forces drawing China into participating more actively with the International 
Criminal Court in competition with concerns reinforcing China’s reservations to do 
so); see, e.g., Ken Yang, Prudence without Collateral Damage: China and International 
Criminal Justice, FICHL Policy Brief Series, no. 61, 2016, at 2 (discussing negative 
views in the international community concerning China’s reservations to engage in 
international criminal law initiatives, by way of perceptions concerning a Chinese 
newspaper’s editorial in 2015). 
 15 See Suzannah Linton, India and China Before, At, and After Rome, 16 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 265, 265 (2018) (comparing China and India’s participation in the 
creation and development of the International Criminal Court); see, e.g., Alexander 
Dukalskis, Northeast Asia and the International Criminal Court: Measuring Normative 
Disposition, 17 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 29, 29 (2017) (comparing the interactions between 
the International Criminal Court and certain Northeast Asian countries, including 
China, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan). 
 16 See Dan Zhu, China, Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal 
Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1021, 1023 (2018) (examining Chinese concerns 
regarding the definition of crimes against humanity under the ICC’s jurisdiction 
and its impact on China’s future accession to the Court.); Dan Zhu, China, the Crime 
of Aggression, and the International Criminal Court, 5 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 94, 95 (2015) 
(analyzing China’s concerns regarding the inclusion of the crime of aggression in 
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction); Jing Guan, The ICC’s Jurisdiction 
over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for China’s 
Accession?, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 703, 754 (2010) (examining China’s concerns 
over the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes in international 
conflicts and the ways in which these concerns should not inhibit China from 
joining the Court). 
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non-interference in relation to matters involving human rights, this 
article consequently questions how that traditional approach 
adopted by these Asian states may or may not explain their 
resistance to ICC participation in the context of complementarity.  
Since the ICC is part of a broader landscape of international courts 
and tribunals, this article also considers the substance of the specific 
Chinese concerns regarding complementary jurisdiction in light of 
China’s engagement with international judicial bodies, and some of 
the traditional concerns that have had an impact on that 
engagement.  It concludes by assessing the extent to which the 
Chinese concerns about complementarity would affect China’s 
accession to the ICC in years to come. 
2. THE NEGOTIATION HISTORY OF THE ICC’S COMPLEMENTARITY 
REGIME AND CONCERNS OF CHINA 
The principle of complementarity is widely regarded as one of 
the cornerstones of the architecture of the Rome Statute.17  In the 
quest for agreement on the Statute, the relationship between the 
International Criminal Court and national criminal jurisdictions 
proved to be a pivotal issue at the heart of states’ concerns about 
their sovereignty.  China, whilst supporting the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals, was reluctant to create a body that 
could impinge on national sovereignty.18 
2.1 China’s sovereignty concerns and complementarity 
This kind of concern can be traced back to the establishment of 
the ad hoc tribunals, which raised for the first time the question of 
the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of national 
courts and that of an international criminal tribunal.19  While the 
 
 17 See, e.g., Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International 
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight 
against Impunity, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 591, 593 (2003) (describing the 
centrality of complementarity in the ICC Statute). 
 18 See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 41 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 1999). 
 19 See Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction 
of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 385 
(1998). 
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Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) recognize that national courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over crimes within the competence of these tribunals, 
they endow the international bodies with primacy over national 
courts.20   China expressed its concern that the adoption of these 
Statutes giving the ad hoc tribunals preferential jurisdiction was not 
in compliance with the principle of state judicial sovereignty.21 
While the intrusion upon sovereignty under the primacy model 
could be accommodated by China in very specific instances,22 China 
has been reluctant to yield its jurisdiction to an international 
criminal court permanently.  In 1994, China cautioned that “the 
proposed court [the ICC] should not replace or override systems of 
national criminal or universal jurisdiction: the relationship must be 
a complementary one.”23   In 1996, China reiterated that “[s]tates 
must bear the primary responsibility for the prevention and 
punishment of international crimes.  In the majority of cases, the 
judicial system of a State played a leading role which could not be 
superseded.  An international criminal court could function only as 
an adjunct to national courts.”24 
The Chinese concerns, to a certain extent, were accommodated 
by the concept of complementarity, which provided for the primacy 
of states’ jurisdiction.  As a key element of the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court prepared by the International Law 
Commission, the principle of complementarity was regarded by 
China as “the most important guiding principle of the Statute.”25  It, 
 
 20 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Res. 1901, art. 8 (Dec. 16, 
2009); International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Res. 1877, art. 9(1) 
(July 7, 2009). 
 21  See Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (reiterating China’s opposition to establishing an 
international tribunal by Security Council resolution); Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR, 
48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (stating China’s 
concerns about the precedent raised). 
 22 See Zhaoxing Li 49th Sess., supra note 21, at 11; Zhaoxing Li 48th Sess., supra 
note 21, at 33. 
 23 Kening Zhang, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 18th mtg. at 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.18 (Oct. 26, 1994). 
 24 Shiqiu Chen, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 28th mtg. at 20, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.28 (Oct. 31, 1996). 
 25  Guangya Wang, in U.N. Diplomatic Conference Official Records of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, at 75, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); see also Wensheng Qu, supra 
note 3, at 6 (declaring the importance of complementarity). 
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however, raised concerns about how to precisely define the 
complementarity regime.26  In the view of China, the principle of 
complementarity was not fully implemented in the operative part of 
the draft statute, and some provisions appeared to be contrary to it,27 
including the term “unwillingness” defined by Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute,28 and the automatic jurisdiction under Article 12.29 
2.2 The criteria of admissibility and concerns of China 
Complementarity was eventually regulated by the Rome 
Statute’s provisions on the admissibility of a case and it thus belongs 
to the broader issue of admissibility, rather than jurisdiction.  Article 
17(2) of the ICC Statute declares that “having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law,” the 
Court is to consider whether the purpose of the national proceedings 
was to shelter an offender,30 whether they have been unjustifiably 
delayed,31 or whether they fail to be conducted in a manner which 
was independent or impartial, and they were or are being conducted 
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.32   In the view of 
China, this provision “hardly reflected the principle of 
complementarity; on the contrary, the Court seemed to have become 
an appeals court sitting above the national court.”33 
In fact, during the negotiating process, China was not alone in 
fearing the Court would become an appeal court. 
 
 26 See Shiqiu Chen, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 50th Sess., 25th mtg. at 13–14, 
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.25 (Oct. 30, 1995) (arguing that the ICC should not become 
a “supranational court”). 
 27 See id. (arguing that, regretfully, the principle of complementarity had not 
been fully implemented in the operative part). 
 28 Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that Article 17 might allow the 
ICC to negate a decision of a national court). 
 29 See Jielong Duan, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 52nd Sess., 11th mtg. at 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/52/SR.11 (Nov. 4, 1997) (arguing against giving the ICC 
jurisdiction over all “core crimes”). 
 30 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.17, ¶ 2(a), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
 31 See id. at art. 17, ¶ 2(b). 
 32 See id. at art. 17, ¶ 2(c). 
 33 Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6. 
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While most delegations agreed that the ICC could take 
jurisdiction where no national proceedings were underway, 
there was disagreement about whether the ICC should have 
the power to step in where a national investigation or 
prosecution was underway, but was in reality a “sham” 
proceeding designed to thwart international justice.34  
Many delegations were sensitive to the potential for the Court to 
function as a kind of appeals court, passing judgments on the 
decision and proceedings of national judicial systems.35  They were 
therefore opposed to the ICC being empowered to judge national 
judicial systems.36   China, in particular, expressed the view that 
“[t]he International Criminal Court had only a complementary role 
to play in the event that a State’s judicial system collapsed,”37 but 
“[i]ts jurisdiction should not apply when a case was already being 
investigated, prosecuted, or tried by a given country.”38 
At the beginning of the negotiations, China cautioned that “[t]he 
international criminal court should not supplant national courts, nor 
should it become a supranational court or act as an appeal court for 
national court judgements,” otherwise it “would violate the 
principle of complementarity.” 39   As negotiations continued, 
resistance to the inclusion of the concept of willingness started to 
decline.  The majority view was that a failure to include 
unwillingness as a ground for the ICC to assume jurisdiction could 
amount to an invitation for states to block the Court’s jurisdiction by 
initiating investigation or prosecutions merely to protect the 
perpetrators.40   In attempting to allay the concerns that the ICC 
would become an appellate body to review decisions of domestic 
courts, the delegations agreed that the criteria permitting ICC 
 
 34  DAN ZHU, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 82 (Zhimin 
Chen et al. eds, 2018); see also Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching 
Agreement at the Rome Conference, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 69 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
 35 See Holmes, supra note 18, at 49. 
 36 See Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INTL’L L. & POL’Y 281, 284 
(1997). 
 37 Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6. 
 38 Guangya Wang, supra note 25, at 75. 
 39 Shiqiu Chen, supra note 26, at 13–14. 
 40 See Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, Article 17, in COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OBSERVERS’ NOTES, 
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 610 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008); Holmes, supra note 18, at 48. 
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intervention should be as objective as possible.41  Yet it is clear that 
the Court has to maintain necessary subjectivity in order to have a 
degree of “latitude” when deciding on states’ unwillingness. 42  The 
phrase “principles of due process recognized by international law” 
was added to the chapeau of Article 17(2) in response to concerns 
raised by some delegations, including China, that the three 
subparagraphs gave the Court unduly broad discretion to determine 
unwillingness and insufficient objective criteria on which the Court 
should base its ruling.43  This language was originally intended to 
be added to the paragraph that dealt with the independence and 
impartiality of the national proceedings in order to ensure greater 
objectivity. 44   As the negotiations continued, several delegations 
favored the change, yet indicated their concern that this still left 
other criteria relating to unwillingness less objective.  Accordingly, 
it was added to the chapeau that the phrase “principles of due 
process recognized by international law” would serve all the sub-
paragraphs.45 
This solution, however, did not satisfy China, who had proposed 
a different approach in order to make the criteria more objective.  
The suggestion made by the Chinese delegation was that in 
Paragraph 2(a) the words “in violation of the country’s law” be 
added after the words “the national decision was made.”46  Further, 
in Paragraph 2(b), a reference to “national rules of procedure” 
should be included, and in Paragraph 2(c) a reference to “the general 
applicable standards of national rules of procedure.”47  However, 
China’s preference for making reference to national law and 
procedure in determining the unwillingness of a state to carry out 
an investigation was eventually rejected by the Rome Conference.  
After the adoption of the Rome Statute, China reiterated its concerns 
that: 
As stipulated in article 17, the Court could judge ongoing 
legal proceedings in any State, including a non-party, in 
 
 41 See John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 673–74 
(Antonio Cassese et al. ed., 2002). 
 42 See Holmes, supra note 18, at 48. 
 43 See id. at 53. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Williams & Schabas, supra note 40, at 612. 
 46 Yanduan Li, in Rome Diplomatic Conference Official Records, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.12, June 23, 1998, 218. 
 47 Id. at 218. 
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order to determine whether [ . . . ] the trial was fair, and 
could exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of that decision.  In 
other words, the Statute authorized the Court to judge the 
judicial system and legal proceedings of a State and negate 
the decision of the national court.  What was worse, the 
criteria for determining whether a trial was fair or whether a 
State had the intention to shield a criminal were very 
subjective and ambiguous.  For instance, under article 17, 
paragraph 2, the normal legal proceedings of a State might 
be determined to be unfair or intended to shield the criminal. 
It was highly possible that such a provision would be abused 
for political purposes.  In Rome, his delegation had worked 
hard for the adoption of a more objective set of criteria, but 
without success.48 
2.3. Automatic jurisdiction and concerns of China 
China considered the automatic jurisdiction of the ICC to be 
inconsistent with the principle of complementarity.  In fact, the 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was another controversial 
issue in all the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the 
ICC.49   One question was how a state would accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction—whether states would automatically accept the court’s 
jurisdiction over crimes as soon as ratification took place, or whether 
they would have to give specific acceptance to the Court’s 
jurisdiction over each particular crime.50  China argued for an opt-in 
system whereby jurisdiction over certain crimes was not conferred 
automatically on the Court by the sole fact of becoming a party to 
the ICC Statute, but that in addition, a special declaration was 
needed to that effect.51  However, the opt-in system favored by the 
 
 48 Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6. 
 49 See Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 12, in COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OBSERVERS’ NOTES, 
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 547, 548 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) (describing how a 
“fundamental issue in all stages of the debate was whether  . . .  the ICC would have 
vested in it inherent jurisdictions to prosecute the crimes listed in article 5 on 
account of ratification or acceptance of the Statute”). 
 50  See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an 
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 3 (1999). 
 51 See Shiqui Chen, supra note 26, at 14 (stating that the court’s jurisdiction 
would derive from the voluntary consent of parties and would not be mandatory); 
see also Shiqui Chen, supra note 24, at 20; Guangya Wang, in Opening Speech to the 
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Chinese authorities was not adopted by the Rome Statute; rather, 
Article 12 granted the ICC automatic jurisdiction over the crimes 
listed in Article 5 without the additional consent of states parties.52  
The Chinese delegation pointed out that “[t]he inherent jurisdiction 
of the court, when extended to cover all core crimes, would accord 
precedence to the court over national courts; that was clearly at 
variance with the principle of complementarity.”53 
The logic of China’s proposition can be found in the argument 
by James Crawford, who noted that, under Article 12, “the 
requirement of separate consent to jurisdiction is removed for states 
parties to the Statute.”54  As a corollary, he pointed out that “the 
principle of complementarity has no effect in determining the 
existence of [the ICC’s] jurisdiction.”55  It would retain its force only 
in terms of the exercise of jurisdiction, which “is to be given effect 
by the Prosecutor in deciding whether to take forward an 
investigation, and by the Court in deciding whether to authorise a 
prosecution” at the level of admissibility.56  Under the opt-in system 
provided by the International Law Commission (ILC) draft, the 
principle of complementarity had effects on both levels: the 
existence of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which was determined by the 
state consent regime, and the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
which was effectuated by the admissibility system.  The Rome 
Statute, however, defines the question of complementarity as 
pertaining to the admissibility of a case rather than to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.57  In other words, state consent as a first 
layer of protection for state sovereignty at the level of the existence 
of jurisdiction has been removed by the Rome Statute; accordingly, 
 
UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, June 16, 1998, at 8, http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616cpr.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6T2L-QGLP]; Yanduan Li, in Rome Diplomatic Conference 
Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.8, June 19, 1998, ¶¶ 37-38. 
 52 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force Jul. 1, 2002). 
 53 Jielong Duan, supra note 29, at 12; see also Shiqui Chen, supra note 26, at 20. 
 54 James Crawford, The Drafting of the Rome Statute, in FROM NUREMBERG TO 
THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109, 147 (Philippe 
Sands ed., 2003). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 148. 
 57 See Benzing, supra note 17, at 594 (explaining that because complementarity 
affects only a case’s admissibility, it determines when the ICC may exercise its 
jurisdiction, not whether the ICC has jurisdiction). 
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the principle of complementarity is relevant only at the admissibility 
stage on the level of the exercise of jurisdiction. 
3. THE CRITERIA OF ‘UNWILLINGNESS’ AND CHINA’S FAIR TRIAL 
CONCERNS 
In scrutinizing the concerns of China, it is important to first 
examine whether the criteria of “unwillingness” would permit the 
ICC to intervene only when the national proceedings are conducted 
for the purpose of shielding perpetrators of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, or if it would allow the Court to examine all 
issues in relation to “due process,” including “fair trial,” as 
perceived by China.  In the latter situation, the ICC’s role with 
respect to national criminal jurisdiction would be more analogous to 
that of an international appeals court, vested with review authority, 
passing judgment on the decisions and proceedings of national 
judicial systems.  If this is the case, perhaps the concerns voiced by 
China are warranted. 
3.1. The controversies surrounding the criteria of “unwillingness” and 
concerns of China 
The reference to “principles of due process recognized by 
international law” in the chapeau of Article 17(2) has given rise to 
controversies over its interpretation.  Scholars’ views are divided on 
whether a violation of human rights at the domestic level renders a 
case admissible before the ICC.  On the one hand, some have argued 
that: 
[T]he phrase “having regard to the principles of due process 
recognized by international law” . . . requires that the 
assessment of the quality of justice, as reflected in the 
subparagraphs (a)–(c) [of Article 17(2)], takes into 
consideration “procedural” as well as “substantive” due 
process rights . . . enshrined in human rights instruments 
and developed in the jurisprudence of international judicial 
bodies.58   
 
 58  MOHAMED M. EL ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 169 (2008). 
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Therefore, a state’s failure to guarantee a defendant’s due 
process rights, most notably fair trial rights as recognized in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), makes 
a case admissible under Article 17 of the Rome Statute.59  On the 
other hand, the view has been expressed “that the purpose of the 
complementarity principle (and the main purpose of the Rome 
Statute) is to prevent impunity and not to secure the suspect’s fair 
trial.” 60   The ICC will not be equally entitled to step in when 
violations of due process by the national court occur to the detriment, 
rather than to the benefit, of the person subjected to the 
proceedings.61 
 
 59  See Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for 
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 241 (2002) 
(explaining that states that fail to protect the due process rights of defendants may 
be subject to the ICC exercising its jurisdiction); see also Federica Gioia, State 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International Law: The Principle of 
Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1095, 1111 
(2006) (discussing how “allowing the ICC to remedy the failures of national courts 
in complying with due process standards seems entirely consistent with this role” 
as an international body complementing national jurisdictions in meting out fair 
punishment for the most serious crimes); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of 
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 
1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 112–13 (2003) (reaffirming that, under complementarity, 
states lose the right to exercise jurisdiction in criminal cases if they fail to meet 
international standards of due process); cf. Albin Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction: 
Against Fletcher’s Antagonism, 39 U. TULSA L. REV. 955, 963 (2004) (testimony of 
Monroe Leigh) (arguing that “the Treaty of Rome contains the most comprehensive 
list of due process protections which has so far been promulgated”). 
 60 JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 221 (2008). 
 61  See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 156–57 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that ICC intervention requires 
a showing that the State is unwilling or unable to conduct “proceedings genuinely” 
with the “intent to bring the person concerned to justice”); see also Benzing, supra 
note 17, at 598 (noting that the ICC “was established to address situations” in which 
“a breach of human rights standards works in favour of the accused”); cf. Enrique 
Carnero Rojo, The Role of Fair Trial Considerations in the Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: From ‘No Peace without Justice’ to ‘No Peace with Victor’s 
Justice’?, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 829, 869 (2005) (arguing that the human rights 
mentioned in Article 17(2) were not read as standards for the Court to protect the 
individual against possible abuses by the state, but as standards for the Court to 
prevent state authorities from shielding a person from accountability).  But see 
Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L. F. 255, 257 (2006) (arguing that 
Article 17 permits the Court to find a State “unwilling or unable” only if its legal 
proceedings are designed to make a defendant more difficult to convict. If its legal 
proceedings are designed to make the defendant easier to convict, the provision 
requires the Court to defer to the State no matter how unfair those proceedings may 
be). 
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The latter view seems to be more persuasive, for it finds support 
in the wording of the Statute and its “preparatory works.”  “The 
general rule of interpretation laid down in [Article 31 paragraph 1 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] does not allow 
establishing an abstract meaning of a phrase, divorced from the 
place which that phrase occupies in the text to be interpreted.”62  
Accordingly, the chapeau and the three subparagraphs under 
Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute should be interpreted conjunctively: 
the Court can only find a state to be unwilling if the national 
proceeding both violates international due process and satisfies one 
of the three conditions specified in Article 17(2), which more or less 
include the requirement of shielding the person concerned from 
justice.  As such, it is not possible to “read in” a stand-alone due 
process requirement to Article 17(2), given that all three 
subparagraphs deal with circumstances benefitting the accused, not 
prejudicing her rights.  During the Rome negotiations, Italy 
proposed a definition of unwillingness which mandated the ICC to 
assess whether the fundamental rights of the accused were 
respected or not; that proposal was consequently rejected.63  This is 
clear evidence that the drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend 
to grant the ICC jurisdiction to look into stand-alone due process 
violations.  The purpose of the Statute also leaves no doubt that the 
ICC was not created to monitor the fairness of the domestic 
proceedings.  As such, unwillingness cannot be declared simply 
because domestic proceedings fail to ensure international fair trial 
standards. 
Perhaps a close analogy can be made between Article 17 analysis 
in the ICC and the ICTY’s experience with Article 11 bis under the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which permits the Tribunal to 
transfer some defendants who are parties for domestic trial to states, 
provided certain criteria are met.64  Under Rule 11 bis, the ICTY 
 
 62 Oliver Dörr, Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation, in VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 543 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach 
eds., 2012). 
 63 See Draft Proposal by Italy on Article 35 (Issues of Admissibility), U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/IP.4 (Aug. 5, 1997) (stating how “[i]n deciding on issues of 
admissibility under this article, the Court shall consider whether  . . .  (ii) the said 
investigations or proceedings  . . .  were or are conducted with full respect for the 
fundamental rights of the accused”). 
 64  See International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Rule 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50 (July 8, 2015). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/5
2019] The ICC: Concerns of China 195 
judges must be satisfied that the accused would receive a fair trial 
domestically and that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has set out 
specific factors for assessing fairness in domestic proceedings.65  It 
should, however, be noted that the ICTY was established through a 
very different political process and has primacy over domestic 
courts,66 which is radically different than the ICC’s complementarity 
system.  The creators of the ICC have already ruled out the 
possibility of granting the Court jurisdiction on the basis of due 
process violations in national proceedings.  Even if one might be 
politically sympathetic to the need to respect due process rights,67 
the door is now closed for such considerations under the current 
legal framework of the Rome Statute.  However, the practice of the 
ICC, so far, has suggested otherwise, and it is likely to intensify 
China’s human rights concerns. 
3.2. The ICC’s practice in relation to ‘unwillingness’ 
The challenges brought by Libya to the admissibility of the cases 
against Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi offered the ICC a 
chance to clarify the extent to which domestic fair trial violations 
matter for the purpose of assessing unwillingness under Article 17 
of the Rome Statute.  The government of Libya filed submissions 
under Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute to challenge the 
admissibility before the ICC of the cases concerning Gaddafi and Al-
 
 65 See Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal 
Court, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 346–347 (2015) (highlighting how “[i]n most 
[Rule 11 bis decisions], the panel recalls [the due-process factors established in 
Mejakic], then cross-references them against the criminal code of the country to 
which the accused is to be transferred and determines if there are any significant 
gaps”). 
 66  See S.C. Res. 827, at 2 (May 25, 1993) (resolving that “an international 
tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991”). 
 67 See Angela Walker, The ICC Versus Libya: How to End the Cycle of Impunity for 
Atrocity Crimes by Protecting Due Process, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 303, 
333–38 (2014) (arguing that the ICC must assume a role in protecting the due 
process right of the accused to be “a ‘meaningful’ enforcement mechanism”); see 
also Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International 
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” 
National Court Prosecutions, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 569, 596 (2013) (suggesting that 
ICC judges could more liberally interpret Article 17 as making a case admissible 
before the ICC when domestic courts fail to provide due process). 
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Senussi on May 1, 2012, and April 2, 2013, respectively.68  Libya 
submitted that the cases were inadmissible on the grounds that its 
national judicial system was actively investigating both individuals 
and their alleged crimes.69  On the other hand, Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi’s defense argued that the Court should declare a case 
admissible if the accused would not receive an acceptable fair trial 
in accordance with the basic international standards of due 
process.70  In the Gaddafi case, both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber did not consider it necessary to address the issue 
of fair trial in the context of unwillingness, as Libya was unable to 
genuinely carry out investigations.71 
In assessing the admissibility of Al-Senussi’s case, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had to deal with the arguments of the defense, which 
alleged that, due to the lack of legal representation as well as lack of 
independence and impartiality, the domestic proceedings against 
the defendant were being conducted in violation of his fundamental 
 
 68 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to 
Article 19 of the ICC Statute (May 1, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_05322.PDF [https://perma.cc/4BKG-Z4SV]; 
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-
01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Relating to Abdullah Al-
Senussi Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02635.PDF [https://perma.cc/8VBJ-4JHQ]. 
 69 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red Application on behalf of the Government of Libya 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, ¶ 68 (May 1, 2012), 
[https://perma.cc/4BKG-Z4SV]; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-307-Red, Application on behalf of the 
Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the 
ICC Statute, ¶¶ 42-52 (Apr. 2, 2013), [https://perma.cc/8VBJ-4JHQ]. 
 70 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11-190-Corr-Red, Public Redacted Version of the Corrigendum to 
the “Defence Response to the ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’,” ¶ 37-46 (July 31, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07805.PDF [https://perma.cc/M2WN-MUVQ] 
(expounding upon the use of the ICC to implement fair trials). 
 71 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi, ¶ 216 (May 31, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_04031.PDF [https://perma.cc/5ZH5-6RZU]; 
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-
01/11 OA 4, Judgment on the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 31 May 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case 
Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”, ¶ 210 (May 21, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04273.PDF [https://perma.cc/YCT2-JHR8]. 
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rights.72  In ruling that the case against Al-Senussi was inadmissible 
before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber “emphasize[d] that alleged 
violations of the accused’s procedural rights are not per se grounds 
for a finding of unwillingness under Article 17 of the Statute.”73  
According to the Chamber, violations of procedural rights would be 
relevant only when they are inconsistent with the intent to bring the 
defendant to justice.74  The Appeals Chamber subsequently affirmed 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment. 75   Addressing a variety of 
challenges brought by Al-Senussi, the Appeals Chamber concluded 
that Libya’s failure to appoint counsel for Al-Senussi did not make 
it unwilling to prosecute under the Rome Statute,76 but its reasoning 
somehow sent a confusing message about whether domestic due 
process violations per se could serve as a ground for admissibility. 
On one hand, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that “the Court 
was not established to be an international court of human rights, 
sitting in judgment over domestic legal systems to ensure that they 
are compliant with international standards of human rights.”77  The 
Chamber suggested that the primary reason for the inclusion of 
Article 17(2) was not to guarantee fair trial rights of the accused.78  
However, it also noted that “human rights standards may assist the 
Court in its assessment of whether the proceedings are or were 
conducted ‘independently or impartially’ within the meaning of 
article 17(2)(c).” 79   The Chamber tried to strike a balance and 
distinguished human rights violations that did not affect the 
genuine nature of the justice process from those egregious violations 
that prevented genuine forms of justice for the accused to take 
 
 72 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abudullah Al-
Senussi, ¶ 220 (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_07445.PDF [https://perma.cc/CVD8-EHA8]. 
 73 Id. ¶ 235. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi 
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision 
on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi”, ¶ 170 (July 24, 
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/AC6S-WSLC]. 
 76 Id. ¶ 200. 
 77 Id. ¶ 219. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. ¶ 220. 
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place.80  The latter violations were considered by the Chamber as 
relevant in assessing unwillingness, but not the former. 81   The 
Chamber especially declined to countenance “proceedings that are, 
in reality, little more than a predetermined prelude to an execution, 
and which are therefore contrary to even the most basic 
understanding of justice.”82  “The [Appeals] Chamber was clearly 
wary of transforming itself into a human rights tribunal, yet it was 
plainly so bothered by the show trial hypothetical that it left the door 
open for consideration of due process and human rights norms.”83  
The Chamber, however, did not provide any tangible criteria 
regarding when due process violations become so egregious as to 
command the Article 17 analysis.  In the absence of defined terms, 
“the judges are left with wide discretionary powers, which carry the 
risk of inconsistent interpretations.”84 
Although the drafters of the Rome Statute specifically rejected 
violations of due process as grounds for admissibility, the Appeals 
Chamber has nevertheless read a due process component into the 
language of Article 17 of the Statute.  This practice has raised the 
issue of “overly creative judicial interpretation,” 85  or judicial 
activism, which represents a deviation in implementation of the 
announced public policy decisions of the legislators.86  In fact, the 
tendency for international criminal courts or tribunals to engage in 
judicial activism was prevalent in the jurisprudence of the ICC’s 
immediate predecessors, especially the ICTY.87  The definition of 
 
 80 Id. ¶ 230. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal 
Court, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 332 (2015). 
 84 Nidal N. Jurdi, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court 
in Practice: Is it Truly Serving the Purpose? Some Lessons from Libya, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 199, 213 (2017). 
 85  See Chatham House, The International Criminal Court and Libya: 
Complementarity in Conflict, International Law Programme Meeting Summary, 8 
(2014), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2014
0922Libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PAC-23SX]. 
 86 See Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An 
Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 377, 386–87 (2006). 
 87 Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly, The International Criminal Tribunals and the 
Judicial Development of International Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1, 3–10 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 
2010). 
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crimes against humanity is a prime example.  In 1993 when the ICTY 
Statute was adopted, it may well have been that customary 
international law required a nexus between crimes against 
humanity and armed conflict,88 or, at best, that the existence of such 
a requirement was subject to debate.89  The majority judges of the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić Case nevertheless concluded 
that such a requirement was inconsistent with customary 
international law.90  The subsequent negotiations to establish the 
ICC preponderantly took the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
as reflecting customary international law and incorporated it in the 
Rome Statute, but the proposal to omit the armed conflict 
requirement was met with some resistance and a number of states, 
including China, were against the innovative interpretations made 
by Tadić Appeals Chamber.91  Although most drafters of the Rome 
Statute “appreciated the results of judicial activism in the past, they 
were not anxious for it to be repeated.” 92   Keenly aware of the 
potential risk, the creators of the ICC equipped the Court with a 
well-prepared and detailed legal framework to limit possible space 
for judicial activism or, at a minimum, make it more difficult to 
justify. 93 
In contrast with its predecessors, the ICC Appeals Chamber’s 
overly creative judicial interpretation of “unwillingness” is striking, 
as it is not the result of interpretation or customary norms, but rather 
of detailed and clear wording of the Rome Statute; thus exhibiting 
its activist attitude. It should be noted that “judicial activism is not 
perceived to be the same as judicial lawmaking,” which “is an 
 
 88  See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
 89 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS; THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 188 (2006). 
 90 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H7P9-565Y]. 
 91 See generally DARRYL ROBINSON & HERMAN VON HEBEL, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 
93 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 1999) (claiming that China and a number of Middle Eastern 
states continued to support the retention of a requirement of a nexus with an armed 
conflict at the Rome conference, which could be considered as an implicit indication 
that these countries did not agree with the Tadic Chamber on its interpretations). 
 92  William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 755 (2008). 
 93 Id. at 755–56. 
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acknowledged phenomenon in international law” and an 
appropriate discharge of the judicial function. 94   Rather, courts 
practicing judicial activism deem themselves entitled to “ignore 
expressions of authoritative policy and assume a competence” to 
determine on their own what the law should be.95  The Appeals 
Chamber’s decision was activist in that it was counter to both the 
text of the Statute and the intent of its drafters.  Because the ICC was 
established and possesses jurisdiction solely through state consent 
as expressed in a multilateral treaty, the Court sacrifices what was 
once a sovereign prerogative by engaging in judicial activism.  As 
observed by some commentators, when a judge invokes a particular 
interpretive canon to yield a desired outcome, rather than being 
guided by the law in light of sound and consistent methodological 
reasoning, it may call into question the legitimacy of the Court.96  As 
such, the judges of the ICC should have behaved more cautiously 
and with due loyalty to the text of the Rome Statute and the intent 
of its drafters. 
Since the ICC came into operation in 2002, China has kept its 
pledge to follow the Court’s developments closely.97   China has 
moved on to deliver pointed remarks about the ICC’s 
implementation of the complementarity principle in practice, which 
largely echo earlier Chinese concerns made in abstracto.  On several 
occasions, China stressed that “the Court should perform its 
functions in strict conformity with the principle of 
complementarity.”98  After the Appeals Chamber’s ruling in Libya 
in 2014, China reemphasized the importance of the ICC 
 
 94  Fuad Zarbiyev, Judicial Activism in International Law—A Conceptual 
Framework for Analysis, 3 J. INT’L. DISP. SETTLEMENT 247, 253 (2012). 
 95 MICHAEL REISMAN, LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 66 (Nisuke Ando et 
al. eds., 2002). 
 96  Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the 
Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 543, 583 (2010). 
 97 See Xiaomei Guo, in U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 41st mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/PV.41 (Oct. 29, 2010) (discussing how China has been closely following 
actions of the ICC); see also Yingfan Wang, in U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 
17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (Jul. 10, 2002) (stating that China plans on following the 
operation of the ICC closely). 
 98 Statement of China at 11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 
15, 2012), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICC-
ASP11-GenDeba-CHN-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript 
available in the International Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index); Huikang 
Huang, in U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 42nd mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.42 (Oct. 31, 
2013); Guo Xiaomei, supra note 5, at 2. 
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“perform[ing] its duties with greatest prudence.”99  In 2016, China 
cautioned that “the Court serves as a complement to national 
jurisdiction, and the Court should fully respect national judicial 
sovereignty rather than replace it, still less become a tool for certain 
countries or group of countries to pursue their own political 
interests.”100  Through this connection, China further pointed out 
that “[t]he question of how to exercise the power of the Court in a 
prudent manner under the Rome Statute—thereby gaining trust and 
respect from States parties through the Court’s objective and 
impartial conduct with a view to realizing the original intent of the 
Court—deserves our serious consideration.” 101   This statement 
seems to indicate that the ICC’s past practice regarding 
complementarity has not yet provided a level of comfort to the 
Chinese authorities.  As such, if ICC judges continue to interpret the 
Rome Statute in such a willful manner and take on more human 
rights mandate in their practice, it will not only exacerbate tensions 
between state parties and the ICC, but also alienate non-party states, 
including China, from joining the Court. 
3.3. Fair trial rights and the Chinese domestic criminal justice system 
In light of its emerging practice, the ICC’s complementarity 
regime may represent more of a threat to state sovereignty than 
originally anticipated by the Chinese authorities.  However, 
addressing these Chinese concerns also requires analyzing the 
extent to which international standards of fairness can be fully met 
by China’s domestic legal system.  The Chinese authorities’ fear 
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional reach into its sovereign matters 
would be greatly diminished if they had confidence in the 
conformity of China’s domestic criminal justice system with 
international standards for fair trials. 
The right to a fair trial is gaining acceptance as an international 
human rights standard in all countries respecting the rule of law.  It 
is an essential component of many international human rights 
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to both 
 
 99 Guo Xiaomei, supra note 5, at 2. 
 100 See Yongsheng Li, in U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 38th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/71/PV.38 (Oct. 31, 2016). 
 101 Id. at 11. 
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of which China is a signatory.102  The right to a fair trial is stipulated 
not only in China’s Constitution Law, but also in its Criminal 
Procedure Law (CPL), which was enacted in 1979 and has since been 
revised three times in 1996, 2012 and 2018. 103   The revised law 
promised increased protections for criminal suspects and 
defendants, as well as a fairer trial process.104  On the face, these 
amendments have brought China closer to compliance with the 
right to a fair trial,105 but they do not fully satisfy the requirements 
of international law.  Many elements of the right to a fair trial are 
still absent from China’s written laws, and certain provisions 
introduced by the revisions even contravene international 
standards.106  Despite the fact that the proliferation of Chinese laws 
meant to protect its citizens’ right to a fair trial, there still remains a 
large gap between those rights that are promised in principle and 
those that are realized in practice.107 
It is clear that the Chinese legal system has been improving in 
terms of the legal guarantees of a fair trial, but it has not yet reached 
the stage of full compliance with international standards.  The right 
 
 102 G.A. Res. 217 (X) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
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by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July. 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), 
art. 8; Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 11; Xingshi Susong 
Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 11 & 14; Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) 
[Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018), art. 11 & 14. 
 104  See JONATHAN HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S 
REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 13 (1996) (discussing some of the protections 
that the revised law of China was intended to provide). 
 105 See Jennifer Smith & Michael Gompers, Realizing Justice: The Development of 
Fair Trial Rights in China, 2 CHINESE L. & POL’Y REV. 108, 111–12 (2007) (outlining 
how some of the reforms to the Criminal Procedure Law appear to be directed at 
protecting the right to a fair trial); see also Mike P.H. Chu, Criminal Procedure Reform 
in the People’s Republic of China: The Dilemma of Crime Control and Regime Legitimacy, 
18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 157, 158 (2000) (presenting the idea that the reforms made 
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 106 See Dan Zhu, China, Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal 
Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1021, 1039 (2018) (arguing that China is still out of 
compliance with certain international human rights standards in spite of the 
revisions). 
 107  See Rongjie Lan, A False Promise of Fair Trials: A Case Study of China’s 
Malleable Criminal Procedure Law, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 153, 160–61 (2010) 
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principle as they are in practice). 
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to counsel and the right to a hearing before an independent, 
objective, and competent court are two examples of this non-
compliance.  Prior to the 1996 amendments, the right to counsel 
under Chinese CPL was only attached at the trial stage and did not 
exist at the investigative stage.108  It was a tremendous improvement 
that suspects could get access to legal counsel from the early stages 
of the criminal process, but the revisions did not go far enough to 
bring China into compliance with international standards.  The most 
significant deficiency of the revised law in 1996 was the discretion it 
granted the investigating body to use “state secrets” as a justification 
for denying suspects access to a lawyer during the investigation 
phase.109  Given the expansive definition of “state secret” in China, 
it can easily turn into a loophole facing the risk of being abused by 
authorities.110   In the CPL’s 2012 amendment, “state secret” was 
replaced by “national security,” “terrorism” and “especially serious 
bribery” as exceptions to the right of legal counsel during the 
investigation stage.111  It seemed that China was trying to legalize 
more grounds to block suspects’ access to counsel, which has further 
vitiated the progress toward meeting the internationally recognized 
standards.  Although the 2018 amendment removed “especially 
serious bribery” from the exceptions list, 112 the current CPL is still 
deficient according to international standards. 
The right to a hearing before an independent, objective, and 
competent court is another important aspect of the right to a fair trial, 
and judicial independence is an indispensable means to realize such 
a right.  Although Article 131 of China’s Constitution Law declares 
that the people’s courts are judicially independent from 
“administrative organ[s], public organization[s],” and 
“individual[s],” the question remains as to whether the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) can be defined as either an administrative 
organ or a public organization.113   The leading role of the CCP, 
 
 108 Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by 
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affirmed in the Preamble of the current Constitution, further creates 
uncertainties as far as its interference in the judiciary is concerned.114  
Judicial independence in China also depends on the judiciary’s 
ability to function without interference from other external sources, 
such as people’s congresses, local governments, the procuracy, the 
military, or members of society.115  For example, a significant form 
of external intervention actually comes from the procuracy.  
According to the Chinese Constitution Law 116  and Criminal 
Procedure Law,117 the procuracy has the power to supervise the 
work of judges and the courts and to call for reconsideration of cases.  
As the procuracy has dual roles as both prosecutor and supervisor 
of the legal process, it has a substantial conflict of interest in 
exercising its functions, especially in cases concerning international 
crimes.  In addition, the Constitution speaks only of independence 
of the courts, without specifically referring to any independence of 
the individual judges.  Although the Judges Law of China provides 
that judges have the right to be free from external interference,118 a 
contentious issue has been the internal independence “of the judges 
hearing the case to issue a final decision without approval from the 
adjudicative committee or senior judges on the court.”119  In addition, 
internal judicial independence may also be undermined when the 
higher courts in China exert undue influence on lower courts 
outside the normal channels of appeal.120  Several rounds of judicial 
reforms have been conducted in China with the intent to promote 
both internal and external independence of the judiciary.121   For 
example, in 2013, the CCP Central Committee adopted the “Decision 
 
 114 See Suli Zhu, The Party and the Court, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 
52, 67 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (discussing the relationship between the CCP 
and Chinese courts). 
 115 See Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and 
Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 69, 71 (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
 116 XIANFA arts. 129, 135 (2004) (China). 
 117 Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), arts. 8, 256. 
 118 Faguan Fa (法官法) [Chinese Judges Law] (amended by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 3, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 8(2). 
 119 See Peerenboom, supra note 115, at 77. 
 120  Id. at 84. (arguing that “higher courts often engage in a longstanding 
practice of responding to inquiries from lower courts for advice regarding legal 
issues in particular cases currently before the lower court”). 
 121 See Lin Feng, The Future of Judicial Independence in China, in ASIA-PACIFIC 
JUDICIARIES: INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY AND INTEGRITY 81–82 (Hoong Phun Lee & 
Marilyn Pittard eds., 2018) (providing several judicial reforms by CCP in China). 
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on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the 
Reform,”122 which is widely interpreted as an important progress 
towards judicial independence, assuring the autonomy of the courts 
on issues relating to their budgets, personnel, and assets.  Despite 
these noteworthy reforms, a completely independent judiciary in 
China is not yet guaranteed at the current stage, and more profound 
reforms in the future are needed to realize it. 
It should also be noted that not all the changes in the Chinese 
judicial system demonstrate a positive step toward providing the 
right to a fair trial.  For instance, the introduction of “Residential 
Surveillance in a Designated Location” (RSDL) by the CPL’s 2012 
amendment is arguably a regression in terms of China’s 
commitment to promoting fundamental aspects of a fair trial, 
including the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, 
as well as the right to be free from torture.  According to the 
amendment, law enforcement agencies would have the power to 
detain persons suspected of crimes related to national security, 
terrorism, or especially serious bribery cases in a designated location 
by the agencies for up to six months. 123  In plain language, this 
means that usual time limits of criminal detention before a formal 
arrest can be ignored, and the suspect can be held incommunicado 
for half a year.  In turn, it opens the door for maltreatment and 
torture, as a detained individual is totally isolated from the 
surrounding world.  The Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has found that incommunicado detention may 
violate Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and inhuman, 
cruel and degrading treatment.124  In its 2015 review of China, the 
Committee Against Torture urged China to repeal “the provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Law that allow suspects to be held de 
facto incommunicado, at a designated location, while under 
residential surveillance.” 125   Although the 2018 amendment has 
 
 122 Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform 
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excluded the application of RSDL to serious bribery cases, 126 the 
agents of state are still granted unfettered power to act in the 
preservation of national security and against terrorism.  It should be 
noted that “endangering national security” or “terrorism” are 
vaguely defined offenses that can be manipulated to cover 
international crimes. 
China’s legal system is still at an early stage of development, and 
accordingly is still struggling to realize the promise of the right to a 
fair trial.  Wide discrepancy often exists in China between the law 
on paper and the law in practice.  In 2004, the Chinese Constitution 
was amended to expressly provide that “the state respects and 
safeguards human rights,” 127  indicating perhaps a greater 
commitment to effective realization of the rights provided by the 
constitution.  Nevertheless, claims based directly on the 
Constitution are generally not justiciable.  It has long been 
contended that China lacks specific procedures and mechanisms for 
implementing the Constitution, which subsequently renders the 
Constitution toothless. 128   Similarly, Chinese nationals have no 
recourse to mechanisms for international enforcement of their fair 
trial rights, as China has intentionally opted out of all individual 
petition systems of international human rights treaties, and Asia is 
the only region not covered by regional human rights treaties.  
Although after the latest revision, the Chinese Criminal Procedure 
Law is much more in conformity with international standards, the 
question remains as to whether these changes have only taken place 
in theory.  In fact, the right to a fair trial cannot be materialized 
without significant legal and judicial reform taking place in China.129 
Judicial reform is by no means new in China,130 but the Chinese 
authorities’ increasing commitment to the rule of law and human 
rights has made it possible for judicial reforms to move forward 
speedily in recently years.  Since the 18th Communist Party of China 
National Congress in late 2012, a number of judicial reforms have 
been conducted with the aim of promoting fair trial rights.  Several 
 
 126  See Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法 ) [Criminal Procedure Law] 
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 128 See Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of 
Constitutional Development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 952 (2010). 
 129 See Lan, supra note 107, at 165. 
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white papers detailing the progress of judicial reforms have been 
issued regularly by the Chinese government.131  The most recent 
white paper “Progress in Human Rights over the 40 Years of Reform 
and Opening Up in China” noted that China has effectively 
enhanced judicial protection of human rights, and that progress has 
been boosted under the country’s deepened judicial reform. 132  
Although the Chinese authorities have been trying to sustain the 
momentum for judicial reform, one cannot be overly optimistic 
about immediate prospects for China’s compliance with 
internationally recognized fair trial standards.  While committed to 
following international rules and standards, China constantly insists 
on a relativistic approach to human rights protection based on each 
country’s unique conditions and is trying to build up a judicial 
system that reflects its own history, culture, values, and political 
peculiarities.133  The context of the ICC’s complementarity regime 
underscores the importance of fully respecting “choice by relevant 
states or regions for specific means to realize justice,” and takes into 
account “their judicial traditions and practical needs.”134  In fact, the 
Chinese authorities have been using “Chinese characteristics” for 
explaining the actual divergence between China’s CPL and 
international standards, which will be discussed later in this article. 
 
 131 See Info. Off. of the St. Council, China, Whitepaper on Judicial Reform in China 
(Oct. 2012), 
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(Nov. 15, 2012), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICC-
ASP11-GenDeba-CHN-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript 
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4. COMPLEMENTARITY AND AUTOMATIC JURISDICTION OF THE ICC: 
CONCERNS OF CHINA 
Apart from its fair trial concerns, China also considered the 
concept of automatic jurisdiction to be inconsistent with the 
principle of complementarity.  As illustrated earlier, due to 
automatic jurisdiction of the ICC, the principle of complementarity 
has no effect in determining the existence of the jurisdiction, 
although it still plays a role at the level of the exercise of jurisdiction.  
In fact, China’s concern towards the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction has 
resonance with its traditional position with respect to international 
judicial bodies, although the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction is 
articulated in the specific ICC context. 
4.1. China’s traditional concerns towards compulsory jurisdiction 
Historically, China kept a distance from international 
adjudication and considered compulsory jurisdiction to be 
antithetical to state sovereignty.  In the view of China: 
States should settle their disputes through negotiation and 
consultation . . . States were free to choose other means to 
settle their disputes.  However, if a sovereign State were 
asked to accept unconditionally the compulsory jurisdiction 
of an international judicial organ, that would amount to 
placing that organ above the sovereign State, which was 
contrary to the principle of State sovereignty.135   
However, there has been greater Chinese engagement with a 
wider range of international adjudicative bodies since the 1990s, 
contemporary with or even after the ICC negotiation.  It seems that 
China’s primary concern regarding compulsory jurisdiction which 
had traditionally restricted its engagement with international 
adjudication has been obviated in the contexts of the World Trade 
Organization, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. 136   Should the ICC be considered along the same lines, its 
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automatic jurisdiction would no longer be regarded as an 
impediment to China’s accession to the Rome Statute. 
While there has been substantial Chinese acceptance in relation 
to compulsory jurisdiction of international juridical bodies in 
economic and technical areas, there is still a reluctance to do so in 
certain fields, including military activities, sovereignty disputes, 
and more significantly, human rights.  It is apparent that the 
different subject areas over which each body has jurisdiction have 
also influenced China’s approach towards international 
adjudication.  Relinquishing control in trade and investment cases 
coincides with economic interests, which are customarily prioritized 
and are less politically sensitive in China.  In addition, resolving 
economic disputes through an international legal forum can also 
help China to diffuse public anxiety and political tensions that can 
arise within its domestic market, and thus to maintain political 
stability. 137   Even though there has been a greater Chinese 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial 
bodies, China still jealously guards its prerogatives to select the 
areas in which it will relinquish sovereignty.  It is obvious that China 
has had and will continue to have sovereignty concerns with respect 
to the way in which certain international human rights instruments 
and their associated institutional architecture operate, but the ICC is 
not the appropriate box in which to place these kinds of concerns if 
its mandate could be properly perceived by the Chinese authorities.  
While international human rights bodies mainly deal with ordinary 
human rights violations, the ICC is only concerned with gross 
human rights violations that amount to international crimes.  In fact, 
China’s past practice has implicitly acknowledged the dichotomy 
between ordinary human rights violations and gross human rights 
violations. 
4.2. China’s dichotomy towards human rights violations 
In the view of China, “human rights are essential matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a country.  Respect for each country’s 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are universally 
recognized principles of international law, which . . . of course [are] 
 
 137  See Kennan J. Castel-Fodor, Providing a Release Valve: The U.S.-China 
Experience with the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 201, 222 
(2013). 
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applicable to the field of human rights as well.”138  As such, China’s 
position on human rights issues was, to a large extent, based on the 
understanding that human rights law enforcement can be 
administrated only by sovereign states and not through an 
international mechanism.  While the Chinese authorities have 
ratified most of the international human rights treaties, including 
major international conventions, 139  they consistently refuse to 
recognize the competence of the relevant human rights governing 
bodies to receive and consider individual complaints of human 
rights violations against China. 140  Notwithstanding this position, 
China left some room for international intervention with respect to 
gross human rights violations by acknowledging that “the 
International Community should interfere with and stop acts that 
endanger world peace and security, such as gross human rights 
violations caused by colonialism, racism, foreign aggression and 
occupation, as well as apartheid, racial discrimination, genocide, 
slave trade and serious violation of human rights by international 
terrorist organizations.”141  In its 2005 Position Paper on UN reform, 
China reiterated that “each state shoulders the primary 
responsibility to protect its own population,” but it also explicitly 
acknowledged that “when a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it 
is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and 
defuse the crisis.”142  China’s different approaches towards different 
kinds of human rights violations have also been confirmed by the 
Chinese State Council.143   While China continues to champion a 
strong concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in 
interstate relations, it does not rule out, but indeed actively supports, 
certain international interventions to prevent and punish the most 
serious violations of human rights that amount to international 
 
 138 See Info. Off. of the St. Council, China, Chapter X: Active Participation in 
International Human Rights Activities (1991), http://www.china.org.cn/e-
white/7/7-L.htm [https://perma.cc/HE98-K2NQ]. 
 139 See HANQIN XUE, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2012). 
 140 See Zhu, supra note 12, at 51. 
 141 See Info. Off. of the St. Council, supra note 138. 
 142  See Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, 
Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, CHINA 
U.N. (June 7, 2005), http://www.china-
un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm [https://perma.cc/6PWE-AUQ3]. 
 143  See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR 
MODEL FOR THE REST? 127–28 (2007) (discussing China’s “renewed emphasis on 
democratic centralism” as “an attempt to manage diverse views”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/5
2019] The ICC: Concerns of China 211 
crimes.  There has been a growing willingness by China to endorse 
multilateral humanitarian interventions subject to certain conditions 
being met.144  Most significantly, in 2011, China allowed the passage 
of the Security Council Resolution 1970, which formed the legal 
basis for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War to protect 
civilians from mass atrocities. 145   It has also been supportive of 
establishing a system of international criminal justice designed to 
adjudicate gross human rights violations that amount to 
international crimes.  Though a non-party state to the Rome Statute, 
China did not seek to use its veto power to block the Security 
Council referrals of situations of mass atrocities in either Darfur or 
Libya to the ICC.146 
It appears that ordinary human rights violations and gross 
human rights violations can be viewed as two ends of the spectrum 
of Chinese human rights policy.  While China has cautiously 
embraced international interventions on gross human rights 
violations as manifested by R2P and the ICC, it is not willing to 
subject itself to international scrutiny for ordinary human rights 
violations represented by traditional human rights treaty bodies.  In 
addition to the lack of legal competence to accept international 
supervision on ordinary human rights violations, China may also 
have some policy concerns that human rights could be used by 
Western states as an instrument to contain China.  In the context of 
the Rome Statute, China is particularly concerned that the ICC 
would become an appeals court, examining a state’s compliance 
with international human rights standards. 
It is true that the admissibility scheme under the Rome Statute is 
analogous to the approach taken by international human rights 
bodies, which gives national systems priority in terms of resolving 
their own human rights problems—only when they fail to do so may 
 
 144  Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on 
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 
220 (2010). 
 145 See Andrew Garwood-Gowers, China and the “Responsibility to Protect”: The 
Implications of the Libyan Intervention, 2 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 375, 383-86 (2012) 
(expressing that “[g]iven the gravity and immediacy of the threat to civilians, 
blocking a resolution would have attracted significant criticism”). 
 146  China abstained in the Security Council vote referring the situation in 
Darfur to the ICC. S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  China voted in favor of the 
Security Council resolution referring the situation of Libya to the ICC. S.C. Res. 1970 
(Feb. 26, 2011). 
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the international bodies proceed.147  The similarity between the ICC 
and the human rights bodies is that both types of international 
bodies will not proceed with a case unless domestic adjudication or 
remedies are unavailable.  However, the substantive criteria for 
determining whether the international body in question should step 
in are different.  With regard to human rights treaty bodies, 
domestic jurisdictions enjoy primacy in dealing with their own 
alleged human rights violations, and only when “available” and 
“effective” domestic remedies have been exhausted can the 
international body proceed.148  Under the Rome Statute, the ICC will 
only take over if the national judicial system is “unable” or 
“unwilling” to take legal action.149  In essence, the different criteria 
are due to their different mandates.  Actually, “[t]he ICC was not 
created as a human rights court stricto sensu “150 or “an institution to 
monitor human rights.”151  The admissibility regime addresses only 
the particular aspects of the proceedings which are referred to in 
Article 17, whereas international law provides alternative remedies 
to address breaches of human rights of the accused in the context of 
traditional international human rights bodies, such as the Human 
Rights Committee. 152   As such, if the ICC strictly refrains from 
performing the mandates of traditional human rights courts, the 
automatic jurisdiction under the Rome Statute should no longer be 
regarded as an impediment to China’s direct engagement with the 
Court, in light of China’s dichotomy towards human rights 
violations.  This, to a significant extent, depends on the Court’s 
 
 147 Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role 
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
MONITORING 15, 27 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). 
 148  WOUTER VANDENHOLE, THE PROCEDURES BEFORE THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY BODIES: DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE? 290 (2004); see also DINAH SHELTON, 
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 113–16 (1999) (discussing wrongful 
death cases where a state’s failure to prosecute counted as an additional injury 
when those cases were litigated in international courts). 
 149 STIGEN, supra note 60, at 219 (stating that “[o]riginally, the ILC did not 
propose the term ‘genuinely’ but rather the terms ‘[not] available’ and 
‘[in]effective,’ both well-known terms from a part of human rights law dealing with 
the adequacy of national proceedings.  The subsequent substitution by the terms 
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ makes human rights jurisprudence less relevant”). 
 150 Benzing, supra note 17, at 598. 
 151 Rolf E. Fife, The International Criminal Court: Whence it Came, Where it Goes, 
69 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 63, 66 (2000). 
 152 See CRYER, supra note 61, at 157 (suggesting that it is more proper to address 
general human rights considerations about the conduct of national prosecutions by 
human rights treaties and bodies). 
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current and future practice in interpreting the criteria of 
unwillingness.  If the ICC continues to examine a state’s compliance 
with international human rights standards during its determination 
of admissibility, it would inevitably trigger China’s sensitivities 
about human rights courts of the traditional kind and its anxieties 
about international scrutiny of ordinary human rights violations, 
especially those relating to fair trial rights.  It should be noted that 
China has signed but not yet ratified the ICCPR,153 which guarantees 
fair trial rights ranging from the right to trial before an independent 
and impartial court to the right to be presumed innocent. 154  
Although in recent years the Chinese criminal justice system has 
introduced several key rights and procedural safeguards for 
criminal defendants, the right to a fair trial is still far from a reality 
in China due to the lack of necessary guarantees to ensure 
compliance in practice. 
4.3. Chinese Characteristics, Asian Values, and Human Rights 
China’s official human rights discourse has also attached great 
importance to “Chinese characteristics,”155 which arguably explains 
the actual discrepancies between China’s Criminal Procedure Law 
and international standards.  According to the Chinese authorities, 
“no country in its effort to realize and protect human rights can take 
a route that is divorced from its history and its economic, political 
and cultural realities,”156 and “human rights can only advance in the 
context of national conditions and people’s needs.” 157   The 
authorities pointed out that “during the past 40 years of reform and 
opening-up, China has consistently combined the universality and 
particularity of human rights . . . and pioneered a path of human 
rights developed with Chinese characteristics in line with its own 
 
 153  UNITED NATION OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, RATIFICATION OF 18 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (indicating 
that China signed ICCPR in 1998). 
 154 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 14, (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 155 See Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (2018), supra note 132, Foreword 
(explaining how “[r]eform . . . has opened up a path of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and ushered in a new chapter in the development of human rights”). 
 156  Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (1991), supra note 138. 
 157 See Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (2018), supra note 132, VIII. Path of 
Human Rights Protection Suited to National Conditions. 
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conditions.”158  As such, in the view of the Chinese authorities, the 
debate about the compliance of the Chinese criminal justice system 
with international human rights law will be distorted if taken 
exclusively from perspectives outside of China’s unique history, 
culture, values, and political system.  China’s insistence on Chinese 
characteristics also reflects its continued adherence to a strict 
concept of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.  
The culture-specific understanding of human rights and the 
primacy of state sovereignty have also emerged as key elements of 
the “Asian values,” which are deeply embedded in Asian inter-state 
relations.  The debate over Asian values originated during the 1993 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, largely in response to 
a pre-conference regional document known as the Bangkok 
Declaration, which was signed by over forty Asian states, including 
China.159  While reaffirming “the principles of respect for national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states,” the Bangkok Declaration argued for the 
importance of unique Asian historical, cultural, and religious factors 
in determining human rights standards.160  Although the document 
never uses the term “Asian values,” “it was seen by many . . . as 
asserting an Asian viewpoint.” 161   At the subsequent World 
Conference, “Chinese and Singaporean delegates propagated a 
culture-specific notion of human rights” in contrast to a “universalistic 
interpretation of human rights.”162  In this connection, the Member 
States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights in 2012, using 
the Vienna Declaration as a benchmark. 163   According to the 
proponent of “Asian values,” human rights are a matter of national 
sovereignty, and each nation should be allowed to adopt standards 
for the right to a trial that are fair in the context of its specific culture. 
 
 158 Xu Jinquan, China’s perspective on human rights widely understood, recognized, 
supported: diplomat, XINHUA NET (Nov. 7, 2018), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/07/c_137590004.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CN6Z-S98S] (last visited Jan. 30 2019). 
 159 Michael C. Davis., Chinese Perspectives on the Bangkok Declaration and the 
Development of Human Rights in Asia, 89 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 157, 158 (1995). 
 160 Bangkok Declaration, 1 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTS. & L.  144, 145–46 (2000). 
 161 Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 
32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 311 (2000). 
 162 Christian Welzel, The Asian Values Thesis Revisited: Evidence from the World 
Values Surveys, 12 JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2011). 
 163 See William J. Jones, Universalizing Human Rights the ASEAN Way, 3 INT’L J. 
SOC. SCI. 72, 77–78 (2014). 
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However, neither Chinese characteristics nor Asian values have 
been advanced in the context of gross violations of human rights.  
Cultural diversity cannot justify gross violations of human rights.164  
Further, “[c]ultural relativist arguments used by ASEAN states to 
contest the universality of human rights are arguably prima facie 
inapplicable to the international crimes contained in the ICC 
Statute.”165  Although there is general reticence among Asian states 
towards universal jurisdiction,166  “Asian values have never been 
invoked to defend egregious human rights violations in the same 
manner as they have been invoked to contest violations of human 
rights regarded as ‘Western’.”167  From a Chinese perspective, the 
contestability of ordinary human rights violations on the basis of 
Chinese characteristics contrasts with the universality of gross 
human rights violations, but no clear dividing line between the two 
categories has been provided by the authorities.  In fact, “gross,” 
“serious,” “grave,” “flagrant,” and other qualifiers (“egregious,” 
“massive”) are often used interchangeably and sometimes 
cumulatively by various international and regional human rights 
bodies, and no method has been agreed upon for deciding whether 
a given act should be characterized as a gross human rights 
violation. 168   Likely the best analogy to Chinese dichotomy on 
human rights is ASEAN states’ distinction between ‘core’ and non-
core human rights, but the boundary there is also fuzzy.169  Core 
human rights are often regarded as non-derogable rights, jus cogens, 
 
 164 See Bilahari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to Human Rights, 89 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 146, 147 (1995) (arguing that while Western and Asian conceptions of 
human rights may differ in certain ways, there are nevertheless fundamental 
understanding of certain human rights abuses shared across cultures). 
 165 Amrita Kapur, Asian Values v. The Paper Tiger: Dismantling the Threat to 
Asian Values Posed by the International Criminal Court, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1059, 1066 
(2013). 
 166  See Xing Yun, Asia’s Reticence Towards Universal Jurisdiction, 4(1) 
GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 54, 58 (2016). 
 167 Kapur, supra note 165, at 1068. 
 168  See generally GENEVA ACADEMY, What Amounts to ‘A Serious Violation of 
International Human Rights Law’, ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 6 (2014), 
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and gross human rights violations). 
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obligations erga omnes, 170  “[b]ut these equations [also] require 
further explanation” and examination.”171   Though the notion of 
“gross violation” or “core human rights” has usually been 
approached from the perspective of human rights law, international 
criminalization of serious human rights violations are also relevant 
in defining the boundaries. 
Core international crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity constitute important manifestations of serious human 
rights violations.  The selection of core crimes for which the ICC is 
competent to adjudicate is limited to “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole,” 172  and the 
drafters of the Rome Statute relied on customary international law 
in defining these crimes.  While “a potent customary international 
law norm rejecting impunity for serious violations of ‘core’ human 
rights has emerged,”173 the scope of customary international law has 
been contested.  One hotly debated issue which proved to be 
concerning for China and other Asian states was whether a nexus to 
armed conflict needed to be included in the definition of crimes 
against humanity.174  Without a linkage to armed conflict, China 
maintained, “many actions listed under that heading of the crimes 
against humanity belongs to the area of human rights rather than 
international criminal law.”175  It further pointed out that: 
what the international community needed at the current 
stage was not a human rights court but a criminal court that 
punished international crimes of exceptional gravity. The 
injection of human rights elements would lead to a 
 
 170  See Diane A. Desierto, Universalizing Core Human Rights in the “New” 
ASEAN: A Reassessment of Culture and Development Justifications Against the Global 
Rejection of Impunity, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L L. 77, 95 (2009). 
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 174 See Darryl Robinson & Herman von Hebel, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of 
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STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79, 91 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (describing how 
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proliferation of human rights cases, weaken the mandate of 
the Court to punish the most serious crimes and thus defeat 
the purpose of establishing such a court.176 
As discussed earlier, the customary law surrounding crimes 
against humanity was developed significantly through innovative 
interpretations by the ad hoc tribunals.  Due to the nature of that 
process and the power conferred on the ad hoc tribunals to develop 
individual criminal responsibility, China did not have an 
opportunity to influence the outcomes or claim to be a persistent 
objector within that institutional context.  The overwhelming 
evidence now points in the opposite direction of the Chinese view 
on these issues, and the customary law status of crimes against 
humanity as reflected in the Rome Statute are now firmly 
entrenched.  It seems that the boundary between ordinary human 
rights violations and gross human rights violations is further 
blurred due to the expansion of international criminal law.  As the 
Draft International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Humanity retains the definition of crimes against 
humanity under the Rome Statute, China reiterated its reservations 
over the omission of a nexus to conflict.177 
Although international law on core human rights violations 
relating to both state and individual accountabilities is not evolving 
in a way that is completely along the lines of the Chinese thinking, 
it is difficult for China and other Asian states to invoke Chinese 
characteristics or Asian values to defend crimes against humanity 
committed during peace time in the same manner as they have been 
invoked to contest violations of undisputed non-core human rights.  
Nonetheless, this may well be a specific concern among states in a 
region where non-interference has historically permitted internal 
state-committed atrocities to remain unpunished.  Unlike other 
regions of the world, there is not yet a well-developed and effective 
regional system of human rights protection in Asia, which is a 
reflection of the general reluctance at the regional governmental 
level to adopt an internationalized approach to issues that are 
traditionally seen as internal matters, particularly questions relating 
to non-core human rights violations and accountability measures.  
This cautious Asian approach to human rights however does not 
necessarily affect their support for international criminal law.  
Rather, there is a growing acceptance among Asian states for 
 
 176 See Dahai Qi, supra note 4, at 6. 
 177 See Xu Hong, supra note 5. 
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individual criminal responsibility regarding core human rights 
violations.  As observed by former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari 
Kausikan: 
International law has evolved to the point that how a country 
treats its citizens is no longer a matter for its exclusive 
determination.  But international human rights law still co-
exists uneasily, and in as yet an unresolved matter, with the 
fundamental principle of national sovereignty.  It would 
thus be prudent to restrict such discussions to gross and 
egregious violations of human rights, which clearly admit of 
no derogation on the grounds of national sovereignty.  
Attempting to expand the debate to areas where there are 
legitimate national differences of interpretation or 
implementation only exacerbates misunderstanding and 
prevents consensus.178 
This holds particularly true for the ICC’s implementation of its 
mandate, which is to end impunity for most serious international 
crimes rather than monitoring the fairness of domestic proceedings.  
However, in light of the emerging practice of the ICC on 
complementarity, the risk to sovereignty and Asian values posed by 
the ICC may be higher than originally anticipated. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Chinese concerns regarding the complementarity regime of 
the ICC at one level relate to the uncertainties about the means by 
which particular provisions regarding admissibility would be 
applied; at another level they echo China’s traditional concerns with 
respect to international judicial bodies.  However, since Chinese 
formulation of its concerns some 20 years ago, there have been 
developments in practice both in the specific ICC context and in the 
wider context of China’s engagement with international 
adjudicative bodies.  As such, there is both an obvious need and 
opportunity for the Chinese authorities to reassess its objections 
towards the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime, which were 
articulated as one of the legal barriers preventing China from 
moving towards more direct engagement with the ICC. 
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Although China by and large supported the principle of 
complementarity, it had reservations over the way in which 
complementarity was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute.  
As the Statute granted the ICC automatic jurisdiction, which was 
considered by China as undermining state sovereignty and the 
principle of complementarity, therefore, the extent to which the 
reduced role of state consent in determining the existence of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction was effectively addressed by the way in which the 
principle of complementarity was factored into the Statute as part of 
the admissibility regime could be key to assessing the underlying 
Chinese concerns.  Back in 1998, a lingering hesitation existed 
among Chinese policy-makers that the ICC might become an 
appeals court, judging a state’s compliance with international 
human rights standards when considering the issue of admissibility.  
Although the Rome Statute was clear in its core content on 
admissibility, there was still a lack of clarity as to precisely how 
aspects of admissibility would apply in practice.  It is 
understandable that China regarded the Court with a degree of 
suspicion while the uncertainties remained.  As such, the practice of 
the relevant organs of the ICC in interpreting the criteria of 
unwillingness is enormously important in China’s reconsideration 
of its fair trial concerns.  By becoming a state party to the ICC Statute, 
China will be committed to bringing to account those responsible for 
international crimes, but it does not anticipate exposing itself to 
unreasonable or unwelcome levels of scrutiny, over such issues as 
the fairness of its domestic criminal justice system.  Although 
China’s national judicial system with Chinese characteristics is still 
deficient by universal human rights standards, the ICC lacks 
authority in mainstreaming national courts to dispense justice 
according to international norms. 
China’s objection to the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction, to some 
extent, mirrors its traditional approach towards international 
adjudication.  However, since the 1990s, the primary concern about 
compulsory jurisdiction which had traditionally surrounded the 
discussion of Chinese engagement with international adjudication 
has been broadly resolved in relation to a range of international 
adjudicative bodies properly so-called.  Although the substantial 
Chinese movements in relation to international adjudication have 
been least pronounced in the domain of human rights, China has 
recognized that it is a common task of the international community 
as a whole to put a stop to atrocities and other forms of grave and 
massive violations of human rights, in contrast to categorizing 
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ordinary human rights violations as internal affairs and therefore 
subject to Chinese characteristics.  If China can be fully assured that 
a state’s compliance with international human rights instruments is 
not within the purview of the ICC, the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction 
will no longer be considered as an obstacle in the way of China’s full 
participation in the ICC.  This, to a great extent, depends upon the 
ICC’s practical application of the criteria of unwillingness.  However, 
due to the judicial activism of the ICC judges, the trajectory of the 
post-Rome developments in practice are arguably not heading 
towards alleviating the underlying Chinese fair trial concerns.  If the 
Court continues to take on the role of securing fairness at national 
proceedings, it would indeed add a dimension entirely different 
from the initial idea for the establishment of the ICC, and it would 
inevitably trigger China’s concern about human rights issues not 
only in the specific ICC context but also in the wider context of 
international adjudication.  This kind of practice will similarly 
hinder membership among other Asian states because of the 
perceived threat to Asian values, which consider due process rights 
a matter of state sovereignty and stress that they need to be balanced 
with territorial integrity and non-interference, as well as with 
specific cultural, social, economic, and political circumstances.  As 
such, Chinese characteristics and Asian values can be used as a 
legitimate basis for China and other Asian states’ resistance to the 
ICC treaty. 
While the current gap between China and the ICC has been 
partly caused by the Court’s seemingly expanded mandate over 
ordinary human rights violations in the context of complementarity, 
there have been other legal and policy factors influencing the 
Chinese government’s attitude towards the Court, including the 
proprio motu power of the ICC Prosecutor, the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression, and the definitions of the core crimes.  
Since these concerns were first raised in the 1990s, there have been 
significant developments with regard to the amendment of the 
Rome Statute, the practice of the Court and the Security Council, and 
even in the content of customary international law.  The year 2018 
marks the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute, and it presents 
China an opportunity to re-examine its concerns towards the Statute 
to see if they have become less robust or have been resolved in a 
manner which is in line with Chinese thinking over the past two 
decades.  For example, the Amendments to the Rome Statute 
adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010 directly touched 
China’s pre-existing concerns about the crime of aggression. China’s 
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concerns regarding the definitions of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes are also related to fields of customary international law 
that have been undergoing rapid developments in the past 20 years.  
Were China to take this opportunity to make a reassessment, the 
Chinese concerns towards the ICC’s complementarity regime might 
still be considered an obstacle for China’s accession to the Court. 
Whether these concerns will be diminished in years to come will 
largely depends on the ICC’s future interpretation of the criteria of 
“willingness.” 
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